



After apartheid South Africa devel-oped a relatively progressive rights 
based legal framework with regard 
to housing. There has also been a 
relatively progressive policy framework 
since 2004 when the BNG policy was 
adopted. However in some parts of the 
country municipalities have routinely 
acted towards the poor in ways that 
are unlawful and, in strict legal terms, 
criminal. This has included unlawful and 
often violent evictions, demolitions, 
forced removals and repression of poor 
people’s organisations (COHRE, 2008; 
Huchzermeyer, 2008a). For instance 
in Durban Mahendra Chetty, Director 
of the Durban office of the Legal 
Resources Centre (the organisation that 
has assisted the majority of those shack 
dwellers in that city who have been 
able to seek legal recourse against the 
state) attests that:
I have never come across one 
incident where the City has 
acted in accordance with the 
law in terms of Section 21 of the 
Constitution and PIE Act. There is 
not one instance that we know 
of where the City has evicted 
with a court order. The City, as a 
matter of regular and consistent 
practice, acts in flagrant breach 
of the law... A recurrent theme 
with these evictions is the simple 
callousness with which they are 
carried out. They are carried out 
in an extremely authoritarian and 
high handed manner against the 
most vulnerable people in our 
society – poor black women, old 
people and the unemployed” 
(Chetty, 2007).
Moreover at all levels of government, 
and in all parts of the country, there has 
been a systemic failure to implement 
the substantive content of BNG that 
recommends and makes financial 
provision for participatory and collective 
in-situ upgrades (Ardé, 2008; COHRE, 
2008; Huchzermeyer, 2008a). 
Although houses have been built at 
scale they have been too small, often of 
very poor quality and most often built in 
peripheral ghettoes that have en-
trenched the spatial logic of apartheid. 
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“Depoliticization is the oldest task of politics.” 
- Jacques Rancière (2007: 19)
Abstract
This article provides a brief overview of post-apartheid housing policy. It argues that, in 
principle, ‘Breaking New Ground’ (BNG) was a major advance over the subsidy system but 
that the failure to implement BNG, which has now been followed by more formal moves 
away from a rights based and towards a security based approach, lie in the failure to take a 
properly political approach to the urban crisis. It is suggested that a technocratic approach 
privileges elite interests and that there could be better results from an explicitly pro-poor 
political approach – which would include direct support for poor people’s organisations 
to challenge elite interests, including those in the state, and to undertake independent 
innovation on their own.
’N PROGRESSIEWE BELEID SONDER PROGRESSIEWE POLITIEK: LESSE GELEER 
UIT DIE MISLUKTE IMPLEMENTERING VAN “BREAKING NEW GROUND”
Hierdie artikel verskaf ‘n kort oorsig van post-apartheid behuisingsbeleid. Die oorhoofse 
argument is dat “Breaking New Ground” (BNG) in beginsel ‘n radikale verbetering van die 
subsidie sisteem was maar dat die mislukte implementering daarvan - intussen opgevolg 
deur ‘n grondige klemverskuiwing wég van ‘n regsbasis in die rigting van ‘n sekuriteitsbasis 
- dááraan te wyte was, dat dit nie ‘n deeglik politieke benadering tot stedelike krisis gevolg 
het nie. Die artikel argumenteer voorts dat ‘n tegnokratiese benadering elitistiese voorregte 
verskans en dat ‘n eksplisiet politiese, pro-armoede benadering meer vrugbaar sou wees. 
So ‘n benadering sal, onder andere, menseregorganisasies ondersteun in hulle poging om 
die verskansing van elitistiese voorregte, veral in die staat, te betwis en hulle sodoende 
bemagtig om onafhanklike verandering teweeg te bring.
KE LEANO LA TSWELOPELE LE HLOKANG DIPOLOTIKI TSA TSWELOPELE: HO 
ITHUTA HO HLOLEHENG HO PHETHAHATSA ‘HO PHUNYELETSA’
Ditaba tsena di fana ka bonyane diphetho tsa leano la matlo la nako e fetileng ya 
kgethollo ka mmala. Di hanyetsa ka hore, tsela ena ya ho phunyeletsa e bile katleho e 
kgolo mokgweng wa dithuso tsa ditjhelete, empa hore ho hloleha ho phethahatsa leano 
lena la ho phunyeletsa, leo hajwale le latelwang ke ho sutha ka molao katamelong ya 
motheo ya ditokelo esitana le mabapi le ya tshireletso, ho robetse ho hloleheng ho nka 
katamelo ya sepolotiki e nepahetseng bothateng bona ba dibaka tsa metse ya ditoropo. 
Ho entswe tlhahiso ya hore katamelo ya tsa botegniki e fana ka menyetla ho batho ba 
nang le bohona le hore e ka ba diphetho tse ntlenyana ho hlaha ka lehlakoreng la batho 
ba ratang katamelo ya sepolotiki ya bafumanehi, e ka boelang ya kenyeletsa le yona 
tshehetso e otlolohileng  ya mekgatlo ya ho phepetsa menyetla ya barui, esitana le bao 
ba mmusong, le ho nka ketapele motho ka mong.
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These peripheral townships are ghettos 
as defined in Loic Wacquant’s formula-
tion: “one must stress that the ghetto 
is not simply a topographical entity or 
an aggregation of poor families and 
individuals but an institutional form, that 
is a distinctive, spatially based, concate-
nation of mechanisms of ethnoracial 
closure and control” (2008: 49).
Furthermore these housing develop-
ments have often taken the form of 
what Frederick Engels (1979: 71) named 
as Haussmann:
the practice ... of making 
breaches in the working-class 
quarters of our big cities, par-
ticularly in those which are 
centrally situated, irrespective 
of whether this practice is oc-
casioned by considerations of 
public health and beautification 
or by the demand for big cen-
trally located business premises 
or by traffic requirements. 
Moreover housing developments 
have often been undertaken in a top 
down and highly authoritarian manner 
(COHRE, 2008). The recent return to 
the apartheid and colonial strategy of 
forcibly removing people from shacks 
to transit camps - also officially known 
as temporary relocation areas or 
decant areas - and popularly known as 
amatins or government shacks, is both a 
strategy by which inadequate structures 
are, in the words of Engels (1979: 74) 
“not abolished, they are merely shifted 
elsewhere!” and a form of semi-carcer-
al social control (Huchzermeyer, 2008a; 
Chance, Hunter & Huchzermeyer, 2009).
One of the reasons for the contradiction 
between the law and formal policy 
positions on the one hand, and the alto-
gether more grim reality of state action 
on the other, has been that for some 
years key figures in the national politi-
cal elite have promoted an anti-poor 
discourse about ‘clearing’ or ‘eradicat-
ing’ ‘slums’ that has, in practice, had 
more influence on state officials and 
much of civil society than the formal 
policy and legal commitments to which 
the state is bound in principle. This has 
been compounded by the aggressive 
capture of development by local elites, 
usually via local party structures, that 
has tended to orientate development 
towards the interests of local elites and 
against those of the poor. 
In recent months the state has demon-
strated a willingness to take on some 
forms of the endemic corruption on the 
part of local political elites, particularly 
with regard to the allocation of houses 
(Sokomani, 2007: 11). However there 
has been a simultaneous shift towards 
the formalisation of the anti-poor slum 
clearance discourse. This retrogression 
is most advanced in KwaZulu-Natal 
where the Elimination & Prevention of 
Re-emergence of Slums Act was passed 
into law in 20071. However the often 
stated commitment to extend similar 
legislation to the rest of the country was 
included in the resolutions of the ANC’s 
52nd national conference in Polokwane 
(ANC, 2007) and received enthusiastic 
public support from [the now former] 
national Housing Minister Lindiwe Sisulu 
(South Africa. Department of Housing, 
2009).The general trend towards rolling 
back formal commitments to rights 
based practices has also included 
the proposed amendments to the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Occupation of Land Act (1998)2 and 
a rapidly escalating discourse from 
political elites that seeks to stigmatise 
and criminalise popular responses to 
failed state planning – e.g. the refusal 
to accept forced removal from well 
located shacks to peripheral housing 
developments, the abandonment or 
sale of peripheral houses in order to 
return to well located shacks and so on 
(Hweshe, 2008).
The reasons for this turn to an urban 
agenda that is both elitist and authoritar-
ian are multiple and complex. They 
include an international shift towards a 
security driven approach to the urban 
poor (Zibechi, 2007), the renewed sense 
of possibility for the longstanding elite as-
pirations for an ‘international’ modernity 
read in the apparent success of pro-
foundly authoritarian models of develop-
ment, often based on accumulation 
by violent dispossession, in countries like 
Dubai, India and China and, of course, 
the class agenda of the ANC.
The reasons why the ANC has been 
able to successfully affect this turn, 
despite sustained (although frag-
mented) grassroots resistance (Pithouse, 
2009), are also multiple and complex 
but certainly include the demobilisation 
of the civic movement in the early 
1990s (Neocosmos, 2007), the top down 
political structures of the party (Heller, 
2001), its often violent intolerance to 
autonomous organisation on the part of 
the poor (Lynch & Nsibande, 2008) and 
the general failure to develop popular 
political support to defend and deepen 
progressive policy innovation. However 
recent local break throughs in Cape 
Town and in Durban indicate that differ-
ent types of political challenges to the 
ANC can realise some of the positive 
potential in existing policy frameworks.
This article begins with an examination 
of the international policy consensus 
and shows that independent innovation 
from that consensus is possible. It then 
notes some of the weaknesses of the 
post-apartheid subsidy system and the 
consequent emergence of a state led 
‘slum eradication’ discourse and the 
policy innovation of BNG. The article 
then argues that the ‘slum eradication’ 
discourse has trumped BNG and suggests 
that this was able to happen due to a 
lack of political support for the policy 
innovations in BNG. The last section of the 
article makes some brief remarks about 
the first attempts to implement BNG and 
argues that, certainly in Durban, this has 
been consequent to popular pressure. 
The article concludes by noting that 
although there is a marked resurgence 
in shack dweller’s activism movements 
operate on hostile terrain and remain 
fragmented and fragile.
2. THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY 
CONSENSUS
There is no a priori reason why the 
international policy consensus should 
limit the prospects for innovation in 
South Africa. On the contrary one of the 
failures of post-apartheid South Africa 
has been the extent to which we have, 
often with uncritical and at times clearly 
neo-colonial recourse to ideas about 
what is world class or what constitutes 
established best practice, allowed the 
international policy consensus to shape 
the limits of elite thinking on the urban 
question – including its now routine 
reduction to a housing question and the 
equally routine reduction of the housing 
question to a simple issue of the number 
of ‘units delivered’. This has often been 
at the direct expense of the innovations 
developed during the mass popular up-
rising in the 1980s (Huchzermeyer, 2004; 
Mayekiso, 1996) and the contemporary 
1 For a collection of responses to the Act see the documents archived at: http://abahlali.org/node/1629
2 For a collection of responses to the proposed amendment see the documents archived at http://abahlali.org/node/655
3 Where references are not given to claims made with regard to these movements they come from my own direct involvement over a period of some years.
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thinking and discussion occurring in 
communities and the new generation 
of smaller grassroots movements.3 It 
is entirely possible to, with the young 
Manuel Castells (1977: x) conclude 
that it is: “necessary to oppose to the 
International of technocratic experts a 
new International of ‘social scientists’ 
who...meet in the conviction that 
cities are made by people and with 
the determination that they should be 
made for people.” 
However the structural political weakness 
of poor people as a class in contempo-
rary South African society means that 
arguments made from what Partha 
Chatterjee (2006) calls political society 
are often invisible to, or deliberately 
ignored, dismissed, slandered or crimi-
nalised by the state and civil society.4 But 
debates in civil society around housing 
policy and practice, especially in the 
media and the courts, are taken seriously 
by the media, judiciary and political 
elite. These debates often take the form 
of contestation around what constitutes 
international best practice. Claims in this 
regard are deployed by the state in an 
attempt to discipline civil society critics 
and by many civil society critics in an 
attempt to discipline the state. Although 
this fact indicates how far we are from 
a situation where popular power could, 
even to a small degree, subordinate the 
state to society it is, therefore, neverthe-
less essential to begin any discussion on 
policy questions with some remarks on the 
international policy consensus. A sense of 
the limits of that consensus is also essential 
for an informed response to the institu-
tions, states and donors that shape it and 
advocate for it.
The World Bank, the United Nations and 
the United States Agency for International 
Development, along with allied donors, 
NGOs and research institutes – have, 
to a considerable degree, created an 
international set of shared ideas and 
practices around housing policy. It is often 
noted that this network is neither static nor 
monolithic and that there are vigorous 
internal debates. But it is less well noted 
that some governments do not accept 
this policy consensus, and produce 
independent approaches. These can be 
progressive, as with the 1997 Kaantabay 
sa Kauswagan Ordinance (Partners in 
Development Empowerment Ordinance) 
in Naga City in the Philippines or the 
2001 City Statue in Brazil. They can also 
be deeply reactionary, as with the 2005 
Operation Murambatsvina (Operation 
Drive Out Trash) in Zimbabwe. There is 
also insufficient attention paid to the 
innovation, be it progressive (as with the 
Movement of Workers without a Roof 
in Brazil) or terrifyingly reactionary (as 
with Shiv Sena in India), generated by 
grassroots movements. 
Some argue that the international 
policy consensus is producing a slow but 
steady enlightenment. Janice Perlman 
(1990: 6) concludes that: “Experience 
has shown that there is often a 20-25 
year time lag between new ideas and 
their incorporation into public policy.” 
She suggests that ideas trickle up from 
shack dwellers to researchers, then 
to international agencies and then 
down to national governments and, 
lastly and often only partially, to local 
governments. Others caution about an 
assumption that such a slow and steady 
progress exists. Huchzermeyer & Karam 
(2006) argue that progression and 
regression both occur, and conclude 
that continuing pressure from shack 
dwellers’ organisations is essential to 
balance the pressures brought by other 
forces, with different interests in, and 
visions for, cities:
Examples across the developing 
world show that some countries 
have progressed from repressive 
to transformative policies, while 
others have reverted back to 
repression. This indicates that 
informal settlement policy is 
an area of continuous political 
contestation, with civil society 
groups engaged in an ongoing 
struggle to oppose repressive 
policies, achieve progress to-
wards transformative policies, 
or contest reversion back to 
repression (Huchzermeyer & 
Karam, 2006: 7). 
Gita Verma, writing from India takes a 
still more pessimistic position. She notes 
that since the 1960s housing standards 
for the poor (in terms of plot sizes, loca-
tion, services and so on) have consist-
ently worsened while, at the same time, 
a development industry has celebrated 
its own progress and innovation with 
equal consistency. She diagnoses a 
policy merry-go-round in which old poli-
cies are realised to have failed and new 
policies developed and celebrated 
while no one grasps the nettle of the 
fundamental problem which is that:
It is widely accepted that in-
equitable land distribution is a 
major factor in the emergence 
of slums…[and therefore] the 
root cause of urban slumming 
seems to lie not in urban pover-
ty but in urban wealth (Verma, 
2002: 6). 
From the beginnings of the international 
policy consensus in nineteen century 
British colonialism to the late 1970s the 
ideas that the ‘slum’ was a key urban 
problem, and that the solution to it 
was ‘clearance’ or ‘eradication’, were 
central to that consensus. By the 1960s 
authoritarian modernising regimes, in-
cluding the South African state (Maylam 
& Edwards, 1996), could still receive in-
ternational sanction for slum clearance 
programmes. For instance in Brazil the 
military dictatorship that took power in 
a 1964 coup set up a National Housing 
Bank to: “direct, discipline, and control 
the financing of a housing system 
aimed at promoting home ownership 
for Brazilian families, especially among 
the low income groups” (Perlman, 1976: 
201). The Bank made loans, which the 
relocated occupants were expected 
to repay. The dictatorship aimed at 
full-scale ‘slum eradication,’ and insisted 
that there would be “no more people 
living in slums in Rio de Janeiro by 1976” 
(Perlman, 1976: 202). The creation of 
the National Housing Bank was lauded 
by the United Nations Committee on 
Housing, Building and Planning as “the 
most advanced system of housing 
finance in Latin America at the present 
time” (Perlman, 1976: 204).
However this model ran into serious 
problems due to popular resistance 
to forced removal and the inability 
of people relocated from centrally 
located favelas to peripheral housing 
developments to pay their housing 
loans. In response to this crisis the once-
off capital subsidy was developed in 
Chile in 1978 by American academics, 
advising the military dictatorship that 
had come to power in the 1973 coup. 
This model was then widely replicated 
in other Latin American countries and 
later became the standard World Bank 
model (Smit, 2005).
The World Bank argued for this model on 
the grounds that it brought an end to 
illegal land occupation, that it restricted 
expenditure (because the subsidy is set 
at a certain figure per household) and 
that it successfully provided housing 
to the poorest part of the population. 
However - although the use of the 
4 The most important theorisation of this in South Africa is provided by Michael Neocosmos (2007). However it is important to note that the disjuncture 
between civil and political society is not unique to South Africa. See, for instance, Peter Hallward’s (2008) account of recent politics in Haiti.
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subsidy system, along with a relatively 
large dedication of total government 
expenditure to housing, significantly 
reduced the housing backlog in Chile 
- various failures have been identified. 
They include: the poor location of most 
new housing developments on the 
urban periphery, an increase in social 
problems (including family violence) 
in relocation settlements, a failure to 
integrate housing development with 
other forms of development, and 
the dominance of large construction 
companies in driving housing policy 
(Smit, 2005). Smit (2005) refers to surveys 
of people relocated in Santiago in the 
1980s to show that more than half of 
the people in the formal relocation 
settlements wanted to return to their 
former shack settlements. It is also clear 
that the political consequences of the 
fragmentation of existing communities 
of struggle, and the banishment of the 
poor to the periphery of the cities, were 
entirely to the liking of both the World 
Bank and the Pinochet dictatorship 
they were supporting. But it is important 
to recognise that even when shack 
settlements are not home to critical 
movements they can still be interpreted 
as threatening, especially by authoritar-
ian states. Henri Lefebvre (1991: 374) 
argues that the appropriation that is 
inherent to the shack settlement – the 
appropriation of land, planning and 
style produces “an extraordinary spatial 
duality. And the duality in space itself 
creates the strong impression that there 
exists a duality of political power.” In 
anxious reaction to this duality strategic 
space – “a space that sorts – a space 
that classifies in the interests of a class” 
(Lefebvre, 1991: 375) can become very 
attractive to state and private power.
By the early 1980s there was a general 
shift internationally towards recognising 
the functionality of shack settlements 
for their residents. The reasons for this 
included popular resistance to forced 
removals, the widespread although 
not universal inability of removal 
strategies to successfully ‘eradicate’ 
shacks, and a general decline in elite 
support for state centric response to 
social welfare issues. Following this shift 
shack settlements were more usually 
termed ‘informal settlements’ rather 
than ‘slums’ and by the late 1980s the 
move away from seeing relocations as 
good practice was largely hegemonic 
in even the most mainstream policy 
circles. However two schools of thought 
had developed about in-situ upgrades. 
Huchzermeyer (2004: 53) explains them 
as follows:
One is concerned primarily with 
technological deficiencies, thus 
packaging a once-off physi-
cal intervention…referred to 
as comprehensive externally 
designed upgrading. The other 
is socially…inspired, concerning 
itself primarily with the people 
that experience the many 
and changing dimensions of 
poverty…referred to as support-
based intervention.
The second, socially inspired, model has 
been used in countries such as Zambia, 
Sri Lanka and Brazil. Its ethic is very well 
described in Patrick Chamoiseau’s 
visionary novelistic history of Texaco, a 
shack settlement in Martinique. He de-
scribes a long “fight to be part of City” 
(1996: 25) on the part of the settlement 
which runs from its founding by Maroons 
to resistance to “the modernizing city 
council which destroyed poor quarters 
to civilize them into stacks of projects” 
(Chamoiseau, 1996: 11) to an eventual 
incorporation into the city via a socially 
inspired in-situ upgrade in which:
Each inhabitant told social 
workers, sociologists, architects, 
of his tastes, desires, needs. All 
of this was taken into account 
in the restoration of the hutches 
[shacks], a restoration respectful 
of the souls of the hutches. The 
town council had purchased 
the oil company’s space [on 
which the settlement was built] 
and organized the hutches 
according to their own logic 
(Chamoiseau, 1996: 389-390).
This kind of state response to shack set-
tlements requires a major paradigm shift 
from experts. Academics in Sri Lanka 
have argued that it requires a “non-
dominating and sensitive professional-
ism…the opposite of the traditional, 
packaged, all-knowing professionalism, 
where the bureaucrat and technocrat 
have all the answers” (Huchzermeyer, 
2004: 65). It is certainly more time 
consuming than the first, formal and 
technological, model. The rates of 
satisfaction and well being amongst 
residents are significantly higher, 
however.  Although the World Bank has 
moved away from recommending the 
first model, it still continues to finance 
these types of project and they remain 
common in many countries.
While the preference for upgrades over 
relocation has been widely welcomed 
it has often been argued that, while this 
is progress, it is very limited progress. For 
instance Verma argues that India’s Draft 
National Slum Policy (DNSP), which was 
circulated in 1999, and which strongly 
advocated in-situ upgrades rather than 
relocation, carried the seeds of inevita-
ble failure. Despite all the rhetoric about 
justice, rights and participation it did 
not challenge the inequitable distribu-
tion of land and thereby implicitly but 
“wholeheartedly advocates an option 
that directly endorses the notion that a 
majority section of the urban popula-
tion must live in a very small share of 
urban land” (Verma, 2002: 17). Verma 
notes that although the policy of in-situ 
upgrades was better for shack dwellers 
than one of relocation - and although 
the right to stay was vastly better than 
compulsory eviction - nonetheless, 
these victories only translated into an 
acceptance of the status quo. In Delhi, 
this meant that “one-fifth to one-fourth 
of the city’s population [were] living on 
just 5 percent of the city’s land” (Verma, 
2002: 73). Her recommendation is for 
a partial decommodification of urban 
land via a system of land reservation 
for the urban poor. However she made 
no proposals for a political strategy to 
secure support for decommodification.
2.1 The Return of the Slum
The international policy consensus has 
not endorsed the decommodification of 
urban land let alone the shift in power 
relations that would be required to 
make such a strategy viable. There has, 
instead, been a vigorously contested 
(Abahlali base Mjondolo, 2007; Angotti, 
2006; Gilbert 2007) return to the old 
language of the ‘slum’. The return of this 
language is often traced to the Habitat 
2 progress meeting in Vancouver, in 
1999, at which the Cities Alliance was 
formed by UN Habitat and the World 
Bank. At this meeting, the new Cities 
Alliance developed a ‘Cities Without 
Slums’ campaign. The Alliance provides 
six criteria for the definition of a ‘slum,’ 
the presence of any one of which 
results in an area being designated as a 
‘slum’. They are: a lack of basic services, 
inadequate building structures, over-
crowding, unhealthy and hazardous 
conditions, insecure tenure, and poverty 
and exclusion (Huchzermeyer, 2008a).
The goal of target 11 of The Millennium 
Development Goals is to ‘have 
achieved a significant improvement 
in the lives of at least 100 million slum 
dwellers as proposed in the ‘Cities 
Without Slums’ initiative’ (United Nations, 
2000).  The target will be achieved 
once 100 million ‘slum dwellers’ have 
received an improvement in any 
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one of the six criteria used to define 
a ‘slum’. So for instance if water and 
sanitation are provided the target 
would be considered to have been 
achieved, even though tenure may 
be not secured. Huchzermeyer (2008a: 
338) points out that, according to UN 
statistics, the figure of 100 million ‘slum 
dwellers’ represent no more than 10% of 
the world population currently living in 
‘slums.’ The figure for the global ‘slum’ 
population is expected to double to 
2 billion people by 2030, making this 
a very modest target. She adds that 
this is especially so given that the UN 
estimates that two out of five of Africa’s 
slum dwellers are estimated to be living 
under life-threatening conditions. It is 
therefore clear that:
Achieving the modest Target 
11 would hardly result in ‘Cities 
Without Slums’, and a closer 
look at the Cities Without Slums 
Programme suggest that its slo-
gan was not intended directly 
as a target – it promoted only 
the modest improvement of 
100 million slum dwellers’ lives 
by 2020, subsequently incor-
porated into the Millennium 
Development Goals. As one 
of the programmes under UN-
Habitat’s Global Campaign 
for Secure Tenure, the inten-
tion of the Cities Without Slums 
Programme is to strengthen insti-
tutions and partnerships for slum 
upgrading initiatives at citywide 
level, with decision-making that 
is inclusive of the organisations 
of slum dwellers and their sup-
porting NGOs. Cities Without 
Slums is referred to as the most 
successful and best resourced 
programme under the Global 
Campaign for Secure Tenure. 
However, as Huchzermeyer (2008a) 
shows, the misleading slogan - ‘Cities 
Without Slums’ - for the project to 
create secure tenure for shack dwell-
ers has been widely misunderstood 
as indicating that ‘slum eradication’ 
is a Millennium Development Goal. 
Politicians and the media have both 
presented it in this way, to the point 
where this misunderstanding has 
considerable popular currency. In fact, 
reducing the tenure security of shack 
dwellers in the name of ‘slum clear-
ance’ would create more ‘slums’ - as 
tenure insecurity is one of the project’s 
definitions of a ‘slum’.
3. PROSPECTS FOR INDEPENDENT 
INNOVATION
Although it would be a mistake to 
under-estimate the influence of institu-
tions like the World Bank, UN-Habitat 
and various donor agencies it would 
be equally mistaken to assume that 
their influence absolutely precludes 
independent innovation by states or 
popular movements. When this innova-
tion is progressive its starting point is 
often the recognition that cities are and 
should be shaped by the agency of 
ordinary people on the basis of equality. 
The Brazilian urbanist Marcelo Lopes 
de Souza (2006: 328) observes that: 
“Curiously, even progressive planners 
usually share with their conservative 
counterparts the assumption that 
the state is the sole urban planning 
agent.” This is not, however, the case 
as both private and popular interests 
also participate in planning. The actual 
development of cities is inevitably a 
result of actions undertaken from below 
- by ordinary people - as well as of 
planning from above - by the state, as 
well as by other social forces, such as 
private developers and NGOs. These 
various modes of planning are usually 
interdependent in that they respond 
to and change each other, as well as 
responding to all kinds of other pressures 
and opportunities. This idea of interde-
pendent modes of planning is not, at 
all, alien to contemporary orthodoxy 
with its commitment to public/private 
partnerships and the tripartite model of 
state, capital and civil society (usually 
implicitly conceived of as NGOs5).6  But 
Souza is looking past this orthodoxy to 
also recognise ordinary people, whether 
engaged in survivalist or explicitly politi-
cal acts, as grassroots urban planners.
Of course official discourse from the 
triad of state, capital and civil society 
is enormously supportive, at the levels 
of discourse and financial and political 
backing, of the language of popular 
empowerment when it is, as for instance 
with Shack Dwellers’ International 
(SDI), mediated through and clearly 
dominated by the commanding heights 
of this triad. But Souza is talking about 
something entirely different. His work 
is explicitly organised around the 
ideal of autonomy – “conscious and 
explicitly free self-rule” (2006: 188) and 
not the fantasy of an equal partnership 
between the most and least powerful 
groups in the contemporary world with 
the latter financed by the former. This 
idea, the idea that there can be a 
fourth force – popular action - outside 
of the triad of state, capital and civil 
society, remains fundamentally trans-
gressive and its assertion is often swiftly 
denied, repressed and stigmatised by 
elites operating across this triad.7 The will 
to deny both the existence of this fourth 
force and its prospects for progressive 
action  – be it organised on a survivalist 
or explicitly political basis – has a long 
history but it certainly has no historical 
basis. Manuel Castells recently sum-
marised his findings in The City and the 
Grassroots (1983) as follows:
[T]he decisive contribution of so-
cial struggles to the actual forms 
and meaning of urban space, 
and to the cultural construction 
of cities throughout history, was 
generally overlooked in social 
sciences, as well as in planning 
and architectural practice. 
Citizens were considered to be 
consumers of the city, not its pro-
ducers. I believe the historical 
record, when carefully exam-
ined, provides evidence to the 
contrary (Castells, 2006: 219).
It is notable that in cities or countries 
where there has been progressive 
innovation independent from, and 
sometimes directly opposed to, the 
international policy consensus grass-
roots organisations have achieved 
considerable power and often have 
some degree of autonomy from party 
politics allowing them to represent the 
interests of their members directly.
3.1 The City Statute in Brazil
In Brazil, there has been an important 
step towards the kind of innovation that 
recognises the urgent need to secure well 
located land for the urban poor outside 
of the exclusionary logic of the market, as 
called for by Verma in India. It is important 
not to be overly optimistic about the situ-
5 In light of the deeply problematic tendency to assume that civil society in the form of NGOs is the space for popular participation in politics Partha 
Chatterjee’s distinction between civil and political society is particularly useful.
6 The fact that in South Africa none of the advocates of official forms of public participation, whether located in the state, academy or NGOs, have 
spoken out against the numerous incidences of violent state repression of autonomous poor people’s organisations indicates, clearly, the limits to the 
seriousness of their commitment to public participation outside of spaces structured in dominance.
7 For analysis of recent examples see Hallward (2008).
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ation in Brazil, however. As Huchzermeyer 
notes there have long been:
two tendencies in the Brazillian 
debate on informal settle-
ments, one seeking to humanise 
favelas, the other unrealistically 
wishing to eliminate the phe-
nomenon… The intervention 
ideas they produce are op-
posed – one seeks improvement 
and integration, and the other 
wishes to remove the phenom-
enon of informal settlement 
from the middle class existence 
(Huchzermeyer, 2004: 9).
Nonetheless, in 2001 the City Statute 
was promulgated in Brazil, after many 
years of activism by organised shack 
dwellers. The Statute has been de-
scribed as recognising the ‘right to the 
city’ as a collective right within a legal 
framework governing urban develop-
ment and management. In other words, 
it sees Brazilian cities as “fulfilling a social 
function, particularly with regard to the 
access, usage and the fair and equi-
table distribution of the opportunities 
and wealth” (Fernandes, 2007: 207). It 
includes regulations designed to guar-
antee the social function of property, 
to regularise land occupation and to 
achieve the democratic management 
of cities. This means that the City Statute 
not only commits Brazil to guaranteeing 
tenure security but also commits the 
state to prioritise the social use value of 
urban land and the value of that land 
for the poor, over the commercial value 
of that land for the rich. The commit-
ment to democratic city management 
adds a commitment to substantive 
political inclusion alongside the commit-
ment to physical inclusion. However, the 
implementation and the development 
of associated policies has been uneven 
(COHRE, 2003; Dede, 2004).
3.2 The Empowerment Ordinance 
in Naga City, Philippines 
One of the most successful Municipal 
level innovations has been developed 
in Naga City in the Philippines.8 In the 
late 1970s, Naga, like other cities in the 
Philippines, began to face an acute 
urban crisis brought upon by the high 
rate of urbanisation and the lack of 
affordable housing. The state often 
attempted to recast the housing crisis 
as a policing problem rather than as 
a welfare problem or a social justice 
problem. The result was that, by the 
early 1980s, Naga was well known for 
the adversarial relationship that had 
developed between poor communities 
and their organisations, on one side, 
and private landowners and the City, 
on the other. Evictions and demolitions 
were common. These failed to resolve 
the housing crisis, however, and in fact 
worsened it. People evicted from one 
place simply moved to another - even 
more marginal and unsuitable - loca-
tion. This led to a situation of growing 
animosity and social conflict.
By the late 1980s, the poor had become 
increasingly organised and began to 
forcefully articulate their concerns. In 
1986, the success of the People’s Power 
movement opened up the society to 
popular participation. Shack dwellers 
in Naga City took this opportunity to 
step up their level of organisation. In 
1988, Jesse Robredo was elected as 
the new mayor. The new administration 
pursued a programme of ‘growth with 
equity’ through its own initiatives and 
using its own resources, mostly without 
support from the national government. 
The programme was founded on the 
recognition that although many were 
benefiting from the steps that had 
been taken to improve the business 
climate, an equal number were also 
being forced to pay a ‘social cost’ as a 
consequence of this growth. Robredo 
also made a decisive break with the 
long entrenched practice of categoris-
ing the housing strategies of the poor as 
policing problem, and thus considering 
organisations of the poor as threats to 
be crushed or co-opted.
Over time, various strategies to avoid 
evictions and to secure the right of 
the poor to the city were developed 
in a partnership between the Mayor’s 
office and popular organisations. These 
innovations have been institutionalised 
in various ways.
A key moment in the institutionalising 
of innovation was the passing of the 
Empowerment Ordinance of 1997. 
This landmark legislation was known 
as The Kaantabay sa Kauswagan 
Ordinance (Partners in Development 
Empowerment Ordinance) and 
mandated the city government to 
initiate the establishment of a system of 
partnership with popular poor people’s 
organisations into the Naga City 
People’s Council (NCPC). The NCPC 
was empowered to:
appoint representatives from • 
poor people’s organisations to 
various special bodies of the city 
government;
observe, vote and participate in • 
the deliberation, conceptualization, 
implementation and evaluation of 
projects, activities and programmes 
of the city government;
propose legislation, participate and • 
vote at the committee level of the 
city council; and
act as the people’s representatives • 
in the exercise of their constitutional 
right to information on matters of 
public concern and access to 
official records and documents.
It is striking that in both Brazil and Naga 
City there are very strong movements 
of the poor. In view of this fact it is 
unsurprising that Huchzermeyer has 
concluded that there is an urgent 
need for innovative solutions that are 
not emerging from within the planning 
elite as well as a shift in power relations 
than can enable these solutions to 
actually be implemented. Therefore 
“The demand for alternative interven-
tion might well have to be made from 
informal residents themselves. In this 
regard, progressive long-term support 
for community organisations is required” 
(Huchzermeyer, 2004: 235).
4. POST-APARTHEID HOUSING 
POLICY
4.1 The Subsidy System
The post-apartheid housing deal was 
negotiated at the National Housing 
Forum in 1993, the last year of the 
interregnum between apartheid and 
parliamentary democracy. It was 
developed from local capital’s engage-
ment with World Bank models, a process 
that began in anxious response to the 
1976 Soweto uprising (COHRE, 2008; 
Huchzermeyer, 2004). 
Sarah Charlton and Caroline Kihato 
follow Marie Huchzermeyer in arguing 
that two main groups were represented 
at this forum – one linked to the ANC, 
trade unions and the civic movement 
and the other linked to business. The 
group aligned to business interests 
promoted the model of a capital 
subsidy driven individual freehold site 
and service approach. The other main 
group, aligned to popular political 
forces, promoted a state-built rental 
model based on the European social 
8 For a fuller account of this see  Averting Evictions (COHRE, 2009)
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democratic approach. The final 
compromise saw a state-built ‘starter 
house’ added onto the site and services 
model. It has been widely noted that, 
amongst other questions, “critical de-
bates on the spatial impact of capital 
subsidies and urban restructuring were 
never resolved” (Charlton & Kihato, 
2006: 272). 
In 2001, writing in a Fanonian vein, Nigel 
Gibson ascribed the general ideologi-
cal capitulation of the ANC to a failure 
to develop a popular radical intellec-
tual praxis adequate to the challenges 
of the transition (Gibson, 2001). In the 
same year Patrick Heller also pointed to 
the vanguardism of the ANC and noted 
“the irony of an increasingly Leninist 
party defending neoliberal economic 
orthodoxy” (Heller, 2001: 134).
It has often been noted (e.g. 
Neocosmos, 2007) that after its unban-
ning in 1990 the African National 
Congress (ANC) moved swiftly to demo-
bilise the popular organisations that had 
done vastly more to break the iron fist of 
apartheid than the ANC’s fantasies of 
armed struggle. But it is also important to 
understand that the significant degree of 
autonomy that had been developed by 
popular organisations was lost complete-
ly as they were bought under the control 
of top down party structures. In the case 
of ANC aligned shack settlements each 
local organisation had to reconstitute 
itself as a ‘Development Committee’ af-
filiated to and under control of the ANC 
aligned South African National Civics 
Organisation (SANCO). In the period 
between the unbanning of the ANC in 
1990 and the first democratic election in 
1994 SANCO had argued for the democ-
ratisation and decommodification of 
state housing but after 1994 SANCO not 
only abandoned these positions but 
also sought to become a shareholder 
in the privatized commodification of 
essential services (Huchzermeyer, 2004). 
My own experience and interviews 
over a number of years have consist-
ently indicated that a bottom up social 
movement quickly became a top down 
institution of social control under party 
authority.
The outcomes of the subsidy system 
here have been broadly similar to those 
elsewhere. There has been significant 
success in building houses at scale - in 
March 2007 the National Department 
of Housing announced that a total of 
3 043 900 subsidies had been approved 
and 2 355 913 houses had been built 
since 1994.9 However, as the state notes 
the backlog is actually increasing (SABC 
News, 2007). Smit (2004) noted that 
around 6% of Chile’s national budget 
has been dedicated to housing - the 
average for developing countries, 
however, was only 2%. He argued that 
in South Africa the 1.3% of the national 
budget dedicated for housing would 
have to be significantly increased if there 
was to be any chance of reducing the 
housing backlog via this subsidy model.
But the weaknesses of the system relate 
to the quality as well as to the quantity 
of housing.  It has been widely noted 
that both the quality and the location of 
these developments has often been very 
poor. The exact form of these houses 
varies according to provincial stand-
ards, but the national Department of 
Housing’s minimum norms and standards 
require 30 square metres of floor space 
and the provision of water through, at 
least, a stand pipe in the yard. People 
have complained that “Mandela’s 
houses are half the size of Verwoerd’s” 
(Charlton & Kihato, 2006: 267). 
There have also been major problems 
with the quality of the houses. According 
to Gardener (2003: 30): “Defects are 
common, and have worsened as 
increased minimum standards, and the 
erosion of the subsidy due to inflation 
have squeezed [private] developers’ 
[profit] margins.” It has also been argued 
that the subsidy system can have 
negative impacts on the poor, as its 
individualising effects reduce community 
cohesion and as its commodifing effects 
can make people poorer. 
According to Thembinkosi Qumbela, 
of the South African Shack and Rural 
Dwellers’ Organisation in Durban:   
When these houses are built 
there is no proper infrastruc-
tural foundation, they just put 
slabs, there is no foundation. 
The building material is of a low 
quality. Everything immediately 
begins to break. The houses are 
too small to accommodate 
bigger families. This becomes 
a big problem in the situation 
where parents have grown 
children…who need their own 
privacy, who at certain situa-
tions have their own families. 
The allocation of these small 
houses will go to the parents 
only (Qumbela, 2007: personal 
communication).
Alex Mhlakwane of the Siyathuthuka 
Development Programme, also in 
Durban, makes a similar point about the 
size of the houses: “In the settlements 
people are able to build two bedrooms 
shacks and at least there is a privacy 
for the parents. In the small houses 
there is no privacy and no dignity for 
anybody” (Mhlakwane, 2007: personal 
communication).
Moreover the new townships were, in 
fact, often built on land first acquired or 
zoned for township development under 
apartheid (Charlton & Kihato, 2006: 
268). This was usually on the periphery 
of existing townships and so these 
new townships generally reinforced 
the spatial segregation of cities, the 
isolation of the poor from livelihood 
opportunities and social services, as 
well as the tendency towards urban 
sprawl. This problem has often been 
exacerbated by the fact that there has 
also been little co-ordination between 
government departments to ensure that 
public transport, schools, clinics, libraries 
and so on are provided for the new 
community. Numerous research projects 
have shown that although people with 
better jobs and incomes usually do well 
in relocation sites, poorer people often 
suffer a calamitous drop in income, 
risk increased rates of depression and 
family violence and struggle to access 
schools, clinics, policing and so on.
Sarah Charlton has concluded that 
“Housing projects tended not to be fully 
functional neighbourhoods, but rather 
basic, highly inadequate environments, 
with land reserved for facilities remain-
ing largely undeveloped” (2003: 271).  
Pearl Sithole’s work (2002) has shown 
that in many instances people were 
economically worse off in far flung 
greenfield relocation settlements than 
they had been in better located shacks 
due to the distance of the relocation 
sites from their livelihoods and schools. 
Recent research (Hunter, 2006) indicates 
a clear correlation between high rates 
of HIV infection and peripheral spatial 
location and links this finding directly to 
the reduction in women’s economic au-
tonomy that results in physical marginali-
sation from urban opportunity. 
Thandi Khambule, a young domestic 
worker, who, when she was interviewed 
in 2007 was living in the centrally 
located shack settlement of Shannon 
Drive in the suburb of Reservoir Hills, in 
Durban, and was facing forced removal 
9 See the National Department of Housing website at http://www.housing.gov.za
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to the peripheral ghetto of Parkgate, 
near Verulam explained that: 
For government this is an infor-
mal settlement but for the peo-
ple who stay here it is formal. 
We take our lives and our place 
very seriously. Yes it is not formal 
in the way that the buildings 
are not formal and need to be 
made formal and in the way 
that we need toilets and elec-
tricity and in that way it must 
be made formal. But it is wrong 
to say that it is informal as if it 
doesn’t matter, as if we don’t 
care. The thing is that if you are 
staying in the shacks you have 
got the hope that things will 
get better. If you are staying in 
Underberg [where she comes 
from] you won’t have any 
hope. If they take you to a rural 
house in a place like Verulum 
you won’t have any hope. Here 
the people have the hope.
Mr. S Msimango moved to the Canaan 
settlement in Clare Estate, Durban from 
Vryheid in 1991 to seek work. In 2003 he 
was moved, against his will, to Parkgate. 
When asked how he felt about the 
move five years later he replied: 
I have lost my job because 
of being moved here. I am 
no longer working. We were 
moved from Canaan to Egypt. 
We were told that they had 
failed to get land near the city 
and that we had to come here. 
Everything was demolished. We 
would have loved to stay in 
Canaan – even if we stayed in 
the jondolos and never got the 
housing subsidy. The reason for 
this is that there we were close 
to work (Msimango, 2008: per-
sonal communication).
Government is publicly committed, at 
all levels, to developing ‘integrated 
human settlements’. For instance 
In Durban the eThekwini Housing 
Department’s Mission Statement 
declares that the City aims to:
Ensure that the provision of 
housing opportunities and the 
development of balanced 
neighbourhoods will become 
part of a broader strategy to 
re-structure and transform the 
present sprawling and inequi-
table urban form into a more 
compact, integrated and ac-
cessible environment (eThekwini 
Housing Department Mission 
Statement, n.d: online).
And the state is very aware that it is fail-
ing in this respect. A key finding of the 
2006 State of the Cities report was that:
New housing developments built 
since 1994 have perpetuated...
low-density urban patterns. 
Housing schemes, gener-
ally using project-linked hous-
ing subsidies, have promoted 
the familiar one-house per plot 
housing typology – often on the 
urban periphery reinforcing the 
sprawling, fragmented, racially 
divided character of South 
African cities (South Africa cities 
network, 2006: 59)
Nevertheless the forced removals con-
tinue, often at gunpoint (COHRE, 2008). 
Across the country it has not been 
unusual for people to simply abandon 
relocation houses and move back to 
better located shacks or to refuse to 
leave shacks for relocation houses, as 
often happened under apartheid and 
has often happened with forced remov-
als to peripheral relocation sites the 
world over. For example, in the low-cost 
housing development of ‘France’ in 
Imbali, outside Pietermaritzburg, more 
than 100 houses built at the cost of over 
R2 million have been vacant since their 
completion in 2002. The intended ben-
eficiaries have refused to take occupa-
tion or transfer on the grounds that the 
houses are too far away from the city. In 
the words of one community member: 
“We want to stay here because we 
don’t pay for transport to the city. It is 
better for us to stay in our mud houses 
rather than be forced to relocate to 
a place that we don’t like.” The Ward 
Councillor of the area commented that: 
‘The situation is beyond our control...We 
have contacted people in the informal 
settlement and requested that they 
take occupation of the houses but they 
have refused’ (Hans, 2004: 3).
Other well-known problems with the 
housing subsidy programme include 
widespread local corruption in the 
allocation of low-cost housing units 
and subsidies (Sokomani, 2007: 11), as 
well as in the allocation of construction 
contracts. There is often a considerable 
degree to which this has taken the form 
of the capture of development by local 
elites in and around party structures or-
ganised around a politics of patronage 
with the result that attempts at rational 
planning on the part of officials have 
been fundamentally distorted by local 
party political interests (COHRE, 2008).
Moreover it is widely recognised that 
in South Africa, as elsewhere (Davis, 
2006: 121-150), many shack dwellers 
live in life-threatening conditions. 
Fire and diarrhoea are usually the 
two most immediate dangers. These 
conditions can be easily ameliorated 
within current budgetary limits by the 
immediate provision of basic support 
to shack settlements. However, it seems 
that a major reason for the general 
failure to provide this support is that the 
housing subsidy system has created a 
widespread view that shack settlements 
are temporary phenomena that will 
soon be replaced by formal housing. 
Indeed many government officials have 
stated this directly. However despite the 
large numbers of houses built via the 
subsidy system in the first five years after 
apartheid there was not a decline in 
the number of people living in shacks. 
There is, therefore, no rational basis for 
the assumption that, under current poli-
cies and practices, shacks will soon be 
eradicated. For this reason the failure 
to provide basic life saving services to 
shack settlements - such as electricity, 
toilets, sufficient water, fire hydrants and 
so on - must be deemed a major failure 
on the part of the state. 
The technocratic reduction of the 
urban question to a housing question 
by the state and much of civil society 
after apartheid resulted in a radical 
evasion of politics in the sense in which 
the term is used by Rancière (1999, 
ix)  – “that activity which turns on 
equality as its principle”. Urban plan-
ning was reserved as a state and NGO 
function and progress was assumed 
to be a quantitative question of ‘units 
delivered’, something that accountants 
could audit. In the rush to ‘deliver’ 
more ‘units’ it was forgotten that at the 
heights of its power the apartheid state 
had been one of the largest builders 
of state housing in the world and that 
a properly post-apartheid approach 
to housing would have to consider 
questions such as the quality of houses 
built, the location of those houses, the 
nature of their ownership, the degree to 
which they were served by affordable 
transport, the processes by which they 
were planned and built and so on. 
If we accept Henri Lefebvre’s (1996: 
141) argument that “the democratic 
character of a regime is identifiable 
by its attitude towards the city, urban 
liberties and urban reality, and therefore 
towards segregation” then there is 
a considerable extent to which the 
technocratic agenda, with its inability to 
enable genuinely popular participation 
in planning and its inability to confront 
elite interests with popular counter 
power, is inherently undemocratic.
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4.2 The First Cracks in the Post-
Apartheid Deal – Popular 
Ferment and the Return of 
‘Slum Eradication’
By the turn of the millennium cracks 
began to appear in the post-apartheid 
consensus at both the top and bottom 
of society. The beginnings of a popular 
urban ferment were first organised 
with the formation of the Anti-Eviction 
Campaign in Cape Town in 2000. A year 
later the Landless People’s Movement 
developed some strength in shack 
settlements around Johannesburg. 
Both of these movements contested 
evictions and forced removals to the 
urban periphery as well as, crucially, 
the technocratic approach to urban 
development (Pithouse, 2009).
In 2001, the year after the launch of 
United Nations Millennium Development 
Project in 2000, the then South African 
president Thabo Mbeki mandated the 
Department of Housing to eradicate 
informal settlements (Huchzermeyer, 
2008b:12). In that same year, the late 
Dumisani Makhaye, then Minister of 
Housing in KwaZulu-Natal, introduced 
a Slum Clearance programme with the 
following remarks:
Today, we are announcing a 
R200 million slum clearance 
programme that is specifically 
targeted at slums in and around 
the Durban area. When you 
enter the city of Durban you 
are met by slums and when 
you leave it is slums that bid 
you farewell. Unfortunately, this 
phenomenon is not only exclu-
sive to Durban. Almost all the 
cities in our province have the 
same problem. That is why, as a 
Department, we decided that 
certain drastic steps had to be 
taken (COHRE, 2008: 100).
The fact that this ‘slum clearance’ 
project largely began with the shack 
settlements in the centre of the city, in 
areas reserved for people classified as 
‘white’, ‘Indian’ and ‘coloured’ under 
apartheid, rather than in the peripheral 
settlements where the conditions are the 
worst, clearly indicates that it was not 
primarily aimed at meeting the needs of 
shack dwellers. A number of newspaper 
reports at the time noted that it was 
welcomed by local ratepayers as-
sociations (i.e. middle class and wealthy 
residents). These reports were silent with 
regard to the views of shack dwellers 
(e.g. Makhanya & Sapa, 2001). Two 
years later the Daily News reported that: 
Two years ago, former provin-
cial housing minister Dumisani 
Makhaye announced an ambi-
tious R200-million programme 
to rid Durban of its burgeoning 
informal shack settlements…
It was hailed by many formal 
communities as a breakthrough 
in stemming the rapidly deterio-
rating status that many suburbs 
found themselves assuming. 
However, two years down the 
line, try convincing residents in… 
neighbourhoods surrounded by 
informal settlements that the 
rickety structures will soon be 
demolished. So slow has been 
the implementation of this slum 
clearance project that many 
home owners have stopped 
believing the promises of their 
local councillors that the informal 
settlements will be relocated to 
make way for urban renewal 
programmes. Kenville councillor 
Deochand Ganesh said that, 
while he sympathised with resi-
dents, there was not much coun-
cillors could do…”We only follow 
official channels and hope the 
process is speeded up,” he said. 
Ganesh said there was “great 
unease” in communities that 
were surrounded by informal set-
tlements (Bisetty, 2003: 5).
In 2006, when an attempt was made 
to begin to implement the relocations, 
hundreds of shack dwellers in Kenville 
blocked a major road in protest. The 
police response left a number of people 
severely injured (Goldstone, 2006). 
Residents reported that one person 
later died and that another miscarried 
consequent to the police violence 
(Hlongwa, 2006). Government, typically, 
blamed the protest on a conspiracy on 
the part of the ‘third force’ instead of 
popular opposition to forced removal 
(de Boer, 2006: 2). 
This protest was far from being an 
isolated event. On the contrary from 
2004 a remarkable sequence of popular 
protests began to issue an urgent chal-
lenge to the state across the country.
(Pithouse, 2009). John Pilger (2008) re-
cently argued, apparently on the basis 
of 2006 statistics, that at a rate of 10 000 
protests a year South Africa may have 
“the highest rate of dissent in the world.” 
These protests were often organised 
from shack settlements and most often 
targeted municipal councillors. They 
are, in many cases, well described as 
municipal revolts. They most often took 
the form of blockading roads with burn-
ing barricades and generally targeted 
municipal party councillors. Although 
they were inspired by each other, via 
the media and the mobility that often 
characterises life in shack settlements, 
they certainly had no overarching, or 
even linking organisational structure. 
4.3 Breaking New Ground
The high water mark of international 
policy remains support based interven-
tion, which begins by securing tenure 
and then enabling governments to up-
grade settlements, in partnership with 
credible community representation. This, 
in essence, was the promise of the BNG 
policy in 2004. It declared a ‘shift’ from 
‘conflict and neglect’ to the integration 
of settlements “into the broader urban 
fabric to overcome spatial, social and 
economic exclusion’ via ‘a phased in-
situ upgrading approach” (South Africa. 
Department of Housing, 2004: 12).
Government policy had always recog-
nised the importance of ensuring that 
the poor are housed on well located 
land, but committing to this in principle 
is not the same thing as taking concrete 
steps to realise it in practice. BNG 
observed that: ‘The acquisition of land 
to enhance the location of human set-
tlements constitutes a fundamental and 
decisive intervention in the Apartheid 
human space economy’ (South Africa. 
Department of Housing, 2004: 14). It put 
in place a number of practical measures 
to achieve this. These included plans to 
achieve the integration of peripheral 
housing developments into cities, and 
plans to ensure that future housing 
developments were on well located 
land. With regard to the former, BNG 
introduced a new funding mechanism 
to support the development of social 
inclusion and the integration of rehoused 
communities into the city by providing 
community facilities in housing projects. 
With regard to the latter, plans to access 
well located land included greater co-
ordination between various Departments 
and planning processes, the transfer of 
state land and land owned by para-
statal organisations at no cost, and, 
when such land is not available, the 
negotiated purchase of privately owned 
land which could also ‘be expropriated 
at market value as a final resort’ (South 
Africa. Department of Housing, 2004: 
13-14). Throughout the document there is 
a clear commitment to placing:
greater emphasis on the 
process of housing delivery 
(emphasizing planning and en-
gagement), the quality of the 
housing product (both in terms 
of location but also in terms 
of final housing form) and the 
long-term sustainability of the 
housing environment (leading 
to a focus on institutional ca-
pacity) (Ndlovu, 2007: 2).
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BNG also sought to introduce policy 
mechanisms to promote the densifica-
tion of urban areas - which is a critical 
strategy for ensuing that more people 
have access to the benefits of cities. 
New taxation measures were envis-
aged to promote densification and 
discourage sprawl. The plan also took 
the innovative and proactive step 
of proposing that new commercial 
residential developments be authorised 
only on the condition that they provide 
20 per cent low income units. It sug-
gested that initially these units could be 
located on alternative land, but that 
increasingly the requirement would be 
for these to be spatially integrated into 
higher income developments. 
BNG made another important innova-
tion by insisting that upgrades must be 
flexible, should cater for local circum-
stances, and should be undertaken as 
community projects. This commitment 
was not merely rhetorical. A new 
funding mechanism was implemented 
‘to support upgrading on an area-wide 
as opposed to an individual basis’ 
(South Africa. Department of Housing, 
2004: 17). The new funding instrument 
for informal settlement upgrading was 
thus organised around area-based 
subsidies, according to the actual cost 
of upgrading an entire settlement com-
munity rather than through the previous 
model of standardised and individu-
alised capital subsidies allocated per 
household. No beneficiary qualification 
criteria or beneficiary contribution (e.g. 
saving) apply to this subsidy. This was 
an important break with the individu-
alising aspects of the prior policy. An 
allied innovation was that there was a 
commitment to actively supporting the 
ability of communities, organised as 
communities, to engage with munici-
palities around strategies to identify and 
to meet their housing needs. Moreover 
BNG also sought to enhance housing 
quality, housing design and settlement 
design. However it was not a uniformly 
progressive document: undocumented 
migrants, if ‘detected’ in a shack 
settlement, were to be referred to the 
Department of Home Affairs. 
Following the launch of the policy, a 
number of newspapers carried sen-
sationalist articles about the prospect 
of low cost housing in elite suburbs 
- creating what Charlton & Kihato (2006: 
256) described as an ‘uproar’. But they 
report that:
The Minister of Housing, however, 
was quick to ally fears: “There is 
no intention by the Department 
of Housing to build a ‘low cost 
house on the doorstep of R3 
million house’ as claimed by 
the Sunday Times…there is no 
reason for the Department of 
Housing to negatively affect 
the high income market.” 
Statements of this nature led some 
researchers to conclude that there was 
insufficient political will to seriously ad-
dress the need to increase the density 
of cities and to ensure that poor people 
could access well located housing. 
Huchzermeyer (2004: 9) cautioned that 
‘while a policy shift is occurring in 2004, 
there may not be mainstream political 
interest in, nor bureaucratic support for, 
such progressive innovation’. 
A second and directly related cause 
for concern at the time of the launch of 
BNG was the fact that it was accompa-
nied by a discourse of slum eradication. 
Charlton & Kihato (2006: 258) note that in 
the speeches around BNG there was an 
“energetic focus on the eradication of 
existing informal settlements.” For exam-
ple, Minister Sisulu commented that:
The Premier of Gauteng has 
fired the first salvo in our war 
against shacks. His bold asser-
tion that informal settlements 
in his province will have been 
eradicated in ten years, is the 
best news I have heard in my 
tenure as Minister.
The turn to slum eradication was 
energetically taken up in many prov-
inces. For instance the KwaZulu-Natal 
Department of Housing’s Strategic Plan 
for 2004-2007 ignored almost all of the 
innovations in BNG, and listed the entirely 
fantastical aspiration of ‘eradicating 
slums’ in the province by 2010 as the 
first of its strategic objectives (KwaZulu-
Natal Department of Housing, 2004).  
In its report to the March 2005 Housing 
Summit, held specifically to discuss ways 
of implementing BNG in the province, 
the ‘eradication of slums’ remained a 
key priority, although the target date 
was now moved forward to 2011:
The need for housing in the ur-
ban centres in the province are 
[sic] reflected in the  increase 
in densities (thereby leading 
to overcrowding in existing 
townships), emergence of 
informal settlements and also 
mushrooming of slum areas due 
to the locational opportunities 
presented by areas that are in 
close proximity to employment 
opportunities. It is in the light of 
this background that the slum 
clearance projects have be-
come the priority programmes 
for the Department. The 
Provincial target for clearance 
of all slums is 6 years from the 
2005/06 financial year (KwaZulu-
Natal Housing Summit, 2005: 6). 
All the democratic innovations 
contained in BNG were ignored, and 
instead the Summit recommended co-
ercive strategies to keep poor people 
without access to formal housing out of 
the cities:
The municipalities must be urged 
and assisted to introduce and 
enforce of [sic] municipal legisla-
tive and policy instruments such 
as by-laws, especially with regard 
to the clearance of slum areas. 
Municipalities must secure their 
environments against new inva-
sions. They should also monitor the 
destruction of the shacks once 
beneficiaries have been allocated 
houses (South Africa. Department 
of Housing, 2004: 34).
The illegal occupation of land 
by illegal occupants has to be 
addressed by the Department. 
This will require close coopera-
tion between the Department 
and the law enforcement 
agencies such as the South 
African Police Services (SAPS), 
the National Intelligent [sic] 
Agencies, amongst others 
(South Africa. Department of 
Housing, 2004: 35).
While BNG remains the official policy of 
the National Department of Housing, in 
practice the language of ‘slum clear-
ance’, ‘eradication’ and ‘elimination’ 
drives much of the current common 
sense around housing. This is often 
apparent in comments and actions by 
politicians, officials, police officers, social 
workers as well as in the understanding 
of the housing policy in the media. With 
the passing of the Slums Act in KwaZulu-
Natal, this language has been trans-
lated into law. At the ANC conference 
at Polokwane in December 2007 it was 
resolved, despite clear opposition to the 
Slums Act from organised shack dwellers 
and South African and international 
human rights organisations10, to extend 
the Act nationally.
Experience throughout the world has 
shown that allowing the market to 
determine housing patterns will result in 
the exclusion of the poor. A government 
that is serious about avoiding this simply 
10 There is a collection of statements on the Slums Act at http://abahlali.org/node/1629
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has, at least to some degree, to put the 
social function of urban land before 
the market function. It is now clear 
that there wasn’t sufficient political will 
to achieve this or sufficient political 
pressure to create the political will to 
achieve this.  Although BNG remains 
official policy, most of the policy innova-
tions in the document have simply not 
been implemented.
There is a basic contradiction between 
BNG, with its focus on a holistic and 
consultative process based on the 
development of housing as a form of 
support for communities, and ‘slum 
eradication’ measures. BNG takes 
inadequate housing as the fundamen-
tal problem and seeks to take action 
to develop more adequate housing. 
‘Slum eradication’ takes shack settle-
ments as the fundamental problem and 
seeks to get rid of them. The distinction 
between these approaches lies in the 
fact that, in the absence of other viable 
options, shacks are the most adequate 
housing currently available to millions 
of people. In some circumstances they 
are more adequate housing options 
than small, poorly constructed houses in 
peripheral relocation projects. For many 
people they are also the only option 
for accessing the city or for setting up 
an independent household in the city.  
Using coercive policing and security 
strategies to forcibly eradicate shacks 
will inevitably result in the housing 
conditions of millions of people being 
radically worsened. Perhaps the most 
disturbing policy consequence of the 
language of ‘slum elimination’ is that it 
makes shacks, which are nothing more 
than the self built housing solution of 
the poor, appear as a threat to society. 
This implicitly justifies coercive actions 
against shack dwellers, their communi-
ties and their homes when it is poverty 
and the absence of viable housing 
support for the poor that is the threat to 
society, not shacks. Shacks are a mate-
rial expression of a popular response to 
deeply entrenched social crisis - they 
are not the crisis.
The only way to get rid of shacks 
without doing major damage to the 
well being of millions of people is to 
develop better alternatives in terms of 
cost, location, services and the quality 
of the structures. However, despite the 
clear contradiction between BNG and 
‘slum eradication,’ Huchzermeyer’s 
(2008b: 14) studies show that in fact: 
“The ‘slum eradication’ rhetoric has 
increased with the new housing policy 
of 2004.” We await a full study of how 
the political elite came to be gripped 
with the fantasy of ‘eradicating slums’ 
but it is clear that political will was 
vastly more responsive to elite rather 
than popular interests and that this was 
due to the systemic disempowerment 
of the latter. It seems fair to conclude 
that, in Patrick Heller’s words, one of the 
reasons for this was that “a once strong 
social-movement sector has been 
incorporated and/or marginalized by 
the ANC’s political hegemony, with the 
result that organized participation has 
atrophied and given way to a bureau-
cratic and commandist logic of local 
government reform” (Heller, 2001: 36).
4.4 Recent Local Innovation
Housing policy discourse is being 
pushed in a sharply authoritarian and 
anti-poor direction by the national 
government with the full support of the 
ANC, resulting in alarming new prac-
tices, such as the use of ‘transit camps’ 
and a stated intention to develop the 
legal framework in a markedly more 
coercive direction.
However in Cape Town and Durban 
this national shift is being simultaneously 
accompanied by a limited degree 
of progressive innovation at the local 
level in the form of the first attempts to 
actually implement BNG. In Cape Town 
the Development Action Group (DAG), 
a development NGO is working to up-
grade the Hangberg settlement in Hout 
Bay via BNG (Huchzermeyer, 2008b). In 
Durban, following a year and a half of 
negotiations, Abahlali baseMjondolo 
and the eThekwini Municipality signed 
a deal on 9 February that promises the 
in-situ upgrade of three settlements and 
the provision of some basic services to 
14 settlements (Abahlali baseMjondolo 
and the eThekwini Municipality, 2009). 
The memorandum specifically commits 
the Municipality to seek to take the 
upgrades forward in terms of BNG.
If it is properly implemented this deal will 
mark considerable progress in Durban 
including a decisive break with the 
spatial logic of apartheid (the settle-
ments to be upgraded are in the inner 
suburban core), an acknowledgment 
that settlements need services and that 
development is not an all or nothing 
once off event limited to ‘delivering 
housing opportunities’, a recognition 
that development can be a collabora-
tive process between communities 
and the state and, also, a recognition 
that shack dwellers have the right to 
organise outside of party structures.  
In the case of Durban it is clear that this 
innovation has come about through 
sustained organisation over the last 4 
years by Abahlali baseMjondolo. This 
has not been easy, the movement was 
criminalised from its formation in 2005 
through to late 2007 and there was a 
long and difficult process of negotiation 
with the City during 2008 (Pithouse, 
2009). In Cape Town the strength of 
grassroots organisations like the Western 
Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and the 
Joe Slovo Crisis Committee could well 
be factors in the willingness of the City 
to experiment with more progressive 
development models.
There are no guarantees that the 
attempts to implement BNG in Durban 
and Cape Town will be successful. 
However they do mark progress and 
they do indicate, clearly in Durban and 
possibly also in Cape Town, that the 
state can respond to the urban poor in 
a more humane fashion when there is a 
political imperative to do so. 
However it must be noted that in 
both Durban and Cape Town local 
experiments with progressive policy do 
not indicate a general shift away from 
repressive practices. On the contrary 
in the case of Durban it seems that the 
City may well be hoping to demobilise 
Abahlali baseMjondolo with limited con-
cessions while simultaneously adopting 
a generally more coercive and security 
driven approach to the urban poor. 
There has been an alarming increase in 
attempts to use armed force to in-
timidate people living in settlements not 
affiliated to Abahlali baseMjondolo into 
accepting relocation to transit camps.
But while grassroots movements like 
Abahlali baseMjondolo in Durban, 
the Anti-Eviction Campaign in Cape 
Town, and the Anti-Privatisation Forum 
and Landless People’s Movement in 
Johannesburg have often been quite 
effective at winning and defending 
some gains at the local level they do 
not currently have the capacity to take 
on the national government (outside 
of the courts where this is sometimes 
possible). However in July 2008 Abahlali 
baseMjondolo launched a Cape Town 
branch and in September Abahlali 
baseMjondolo joined with the Western 
Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, the 
Landless People’s Movement and a 
new church linked rural movement in 
KwaZulu-Natal, the Rural Network, to 
form the Poor People’s Alliance. How 
the alliance would work given both the 
geographic distance between Durban, 
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Cape Town and Johannesburg and 
the fact that it has no donor funding 
is not clear. In the past, when Abahlali 
baseMjondolo was only operating 
in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, it 
often proved very difficult to keep the 
struggles in Durban and Pietermaritzburg 
sufficiently connected. If the alliance is 
to succeed it may well be necessary to 
seek non-dominating donor support in 
order to have the material basis to sus-
tain a practical and effective solidarity.
One promising aspect of the alliance 
is that, with its slogan ‘No Land! No 
House! No Vote!’ it has stuck to the 
rejection of electoral politics first taken 
up by the Landless People’s Movement 
in 2004 and then joined by the Anti-
Eviction Campaign and, later, Abahlali 
baseMjondolo. In a context where no 
political party proposes a programme 
in the interests of the urban poor and 
no political party actively supports the 
struggles of the urban poor this enables 
the movements to sustain a clear focus 
on their key issues and, in those areas 
where the movements are hegemonic, 
to develop a degree of dual power. 
This is important because, as Rick Turner 
foresaw back in 1971:
The political party as mediator 
between the individual and 
government tends to take on 
the characteristics of the sys-
tem itself, the ‘party machine’ 
dominates the membership 
and the rank and file become 
increasingly divorced from 
policy making....The political 
arena becomes polarised be-
tween an atomised mass and 
a number of small groups trying 
to manipulate the mass in order 
to get political jobs. The result 
of this is to move the source of 
power in society out of the po-
litical arena and into the control 
of functional power groups... 
(But) there must be other ad-
ditional centres of power which 
can be used by the people to 
exert their control over the cen-
tral body (Turner, 1971: 81)
5. CONCLUSION
Given international experiences, and, 
also, recent experiences in South Africa, 
and in particular recent developments 
in Durban, it seems that there are good 
grounds for endorsing Huchzermeyer’s 
(2004: 34) conclusion that: “progres-
sive long-term support for community 
organisations is required”.
But this call to support community 
organisations is not uncomplicated. 
The mainstream contenders like Slum 
Dwellers International are resolutely 
anti-political and deeply implicated 
in the key institutions of contemporary 
domination and, for this reason, which 
is probably the key reason for their 
attraction to elites, failing to effect 
systemic change. Moreover some of 
the most powerful contenders from 
the NGO and academic left subscribe 
to a top down mode of politics that 
responds to the self organisation of the 
poor with a paranoia, and a propensity 
to authoritarianism and slander that has 
clear echoes with state practices. Left 
hostility towards the urban poor (‘the 
lumpen-proletariat’) remains common. 
There is a significant degree to which 
the self constituted and self directed or-
ganisations of the poor are on their own 
in extremely hostile terrain.11 If the slide 
into an alarmingly anti-poor national 
housing agenda is to be arrested, and 
if new ground it to be broken nationally, 
it will require enormous and sustained 
courage and commitment on the 
part of ordinary people. And it is in the 
struggles of progressive poor people’s 
organisations to increase their power 
and to reduce that of elites across the 
triad of state, capital and civil society 
that academic urbanists will have the 
best prospects for effecting positive 
change in practice rather than, as 
with BNG thus far, merely in principle. 
Indeed, without a progressive politics 
to support them, and to push for their 
further development, progressive policy 
innovations will just be fig leaves for 
repressive practices.
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